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An Inclusive, Progressive National
Savings and Financial Services Policy
Michael S. Barr*
I. INTRODUCTION
How many of us walk by the signs for "Checks Cashed Here," "Money
Orders for Sale," and "Payday Loans: Get Cash Quick" without thinking
about the implications of those signs for the daily lives of lower-income
households? Most of us can take for granted getting our paychecks directly
deposited into our bank accounts, writing a check, or storing our money
in an account. We often struggle to save for longer-term goals, such as our
children's education, or retirement, but most of us, most of the time, do not
worry whether our savings or insurance will be enough to get us through an
illness, or even the loss of a job.
For most low- and moderate-income households, the picture is quite
different. High-cost financial services, barriers to saving, the lack of in-
surance, and credit constraints may contribute to poverty and other socio-
economic problems. Low-income individuals often lack access to financial
services from banks and thrifts, and turn to much more expensive alterna-
tive financial service providers such as check cashers, payday lenders,
and money transmitters. Lack of access to credit and insurance means that
many low-income individuals must live paycheck to paycheck, leaving them
vulnerable to emergencies that may endanger their financial stability. The
lack of longer-term savings may undermine their ability to invest in human
capital, purchase a home, and build assets. More generally, heavy reliance
on alternative financial service providers reduces the value of both take
home pay and government assistance programs such as the Earned Income
Tax Credit. Taken together, these barriers to access contribute to poverty
and make it much more difficult for low-income households to make the
investments necessary to join the middle class.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, and nonresident Senior Fel-
low, The Brookings Institution. This Essay is based on a lecture I gave as part of the AARP
Public Policy Institute's Twentieth Anniversary Invitational Lecture Series. The Public
Policy Institute provided generous research support. Portions of this Essay have appeared
in other works of mine and appear with permission. See Michael S. Barr, Banking the
Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004) [hereinafter Barr, Banking the Poor 1]; MICHAEL S.
BARR, BROOKINGS INST., BANKING THE POOR: POLICIES TO BRING Low-INCOME AMERI-
CANS INTO THE FINANCIAL MAINSTREAM (2004) [hereinafter BARR, BANKING THE POOR
I], available at http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20041001-Banking.pdf.
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Hence, this Essay calls for an inclusive, progressive national savings
and financial services policy. I argue that we need to focus not simply on
retirement, but also on shorter-term savings; not just on the wealthy or even
the middle-class, but also on lower- and moderate-income households; and
not just on building savings, but also on reducing indebtedness.
Taking a broad look ahead, we have a major public policy opportunity:
to enact an integrated, universal approach to financial services, income,
and wealth policies that taps into shared notions of the American dream.
Such policies would help low- and moderate-income households more fully
leverage their hard work into economic stability and future prosperity. I
sketch what such an approach would look like. We also face significant pub-
lic policy risks: a continued shift in tax burdens from the wealthy to mid-
dle- and lower-income households and future generations through con-
tinued borrowing to fund tax cut and through undermining social insur-
ance through the privatization of Social Security in the name of the "owner-
ship society." Low- and moderate-income households would pay a heavy
price for such regressive tax and social insurance policies.
To develop a new national approach, we need to explore the interre-
lationships among financial services, savings, credit, and insurance. Poli-
cies that focus on one area while ignoring the others are unlikely to suc-
ceed. Financial services such as bank accounts can provide the gateway
to saving or serve as an obstacle to saving, depending on the structure and
pricing of products and services. Saving both assists in asset-accumulation
and operates as a form of self-insurance. Insurance smoothes income and
consumption, and protects savings and income against catastrophic shocks,
but also acts as a substitute for savings and thus provides incentives not to
save. Credit can assist asset accumulation, smooth income and consump-
tion, and provide insurance against income shocks, but imprudent borrowing
can destroy asset creation and block access to savings vehicles such as
bank accounts. In each area, I analyze the basic problem and suggest ways
of thinking about policy reform.
II. FINANCIAL SERVICES
A. The Costs of Exclusion
Low-income households in the United States often lack access to bank
accounts and face high costs for transacting basic financial services through
check cashers and other alternative financial service providers.' These fami-
lies find it more difficult to save and plan financially for the future. Liv-
ing paycheck to paycheck leaves them vulnerable to medical or job emer-
gencies that may endanger their financial stability, and the lack of longer-
term savings undermines their ability to invest in improving their skills,
See generally, Barr, Banking the Poor 1, supra note *.
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purchasing a home, or sending their children to college. High-cost financial
services and inadequate access to bank accounts may undermine widely
shared societal goals of reducing poverty, moving families from welfare
to work, and rewarding work through incentives such as the Earned In-
come Tax Credit (EITC).2
Nearly 22% of low-income American families-over 8.4 million fami-
lies earning under $25,000 per year-are "unbanked": they do not have
either a checking or savings account.' Many additional families have bank
accounts, but must rely on high-cost non-bank providers to conduct much
of their financial business. I will refer to this population as the "under-
banked," a term that admittedly makes a normative judgment about the
desirability of connection to mainstream financial services.
In lieu of bank-based transactions, savings, and credit products, the
unbanked and the underbanked often rely on the more costly alternative
financial sector (AFS). AFS providers offer a wide range of services, includ-
ing short-term loans, check cashing, bill payment, tax preparation, and
rent-to-own products, most often in low-income urban neighborhoods.
These AFS providers are currently the only means available for many low-
income persons to access basic financial services, but they often come at
a high price.
While check cashers offer essential services, the fees involved in con-
verting paper checks into cash are high, relative both to income and to
analogous services that middle- and upper-income families use, such as de-
positing a check into a bank account or electronic direct deposit. Check-
cashing fees vary widely across the country, and between types of checks,
but typically range from 1.5% to 3.5% of face value.4 The industry re-
ports that it processes 180 million checks totaling $55 billion annually, gen-
erating $1.5 billion in fees.' Almost all of these checks are low-risk payroll
(80%) or government benefit (16%) checks.6 While even payroll checks
are not without some credit and fraud risk, average losses from "bad" checks
at check-cashing firms are low. For example, the national check-cashing
firm Ace Cash Express (ACE) reported in its SEC filing that 0.5% of the
face value of checks bounce, but net losses after collection are 0.2%.' These
figures compare favorably to the banking system: 0.64% of the face value
of inter-bank checks was returned in 2000.8 The high costs of check-cashing
2 See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2006).
I Barr, Banking the Poor I, supra note *, at 130-31.4 1d. at 146-47.
5 Fin. Serv. Ctrs. of Am. (FiSCA), About FiSCA, http://www.fisca.org/about.htm (last
visited Nov. 14, 2006); Barr, Banking the PoorI, supra note *, at 142.
6 ED BACHELDER & SAM DITZION, DOVE CONSULTING, SURVEY OF NON-BANK FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS 9, 34 (2000), available at http:llwww.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/
nbfirpt.pdf.
I ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, 19 (2001), available at http://www.
acecashexpress.com/annual-reports/2001 .pdf.
I Geoffrey R. Gerdes & Jack K. Walton H, The Use of Checks and Other Non-Cash Pay-
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transactions may be related to labor costs of in-person transactions based
on paper processing, but they appear unrelated to credit risk.
The high costs of alternative financial services raise several concerns.
First, the costs of these basic financial transactions reduce take-home pay. A
worker earning minimum wage, working full time, and making under
$12,000 a year would pay $250 to $500 annually just to cash payroll checks
at a check-cashing outlet, in addition to fees for money orders, wire trans-
fers, bill payments, and other common transactions.9 High fees for tax
preparation, filing, check-cashing, and refund anticipation loans reduce
the value of EITC payments by over 10%. 1° Bringing low- and moderate-
income families into the banking system can help reduce these high transac-
tion costs, substantially increasing the purchasing power of these families.
Second, without a bank account, low-income households face key bar-
riers to increased saving. Promoting low-income household savings is criti-
cal to lowering reliance on high-cost, short-term credit, lowering risk of
financial dislocation resulting from job loss or injury, and improving pros-
pects for longer-term asset building through homeownership, skills de-
velopment, and education.
Third, without a bank account, it is more difficult and more costly to
establish credit or qualify for a loan. A bank account is a significant fac-
tor-more so, in fact, than household net worth, income, or education
level-in predicting whether an individual also holds mortgage loans, auto-
mobile loans, and certificates of deposit. 1
B. Barriers to Banking the Poor
While the banking system works extraordinarily well for most Ameri-
cans, many low- and moderate-income individuals face five key barriers
to account ownership.
First, regular checking accounts may not make economic sense for
many low-income families. Consumers who cannot meet account balance
minimums for an account at a bank often pay high monthly fees. In addi-
tion, nearly all banks levy high charges-averaging $25 per item"2-for
bounced checks or overdrafts, charges that low-income families with lit-
ment Instruments in the United States, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 360, 360, 364-65 (2002).
9 See Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Results
from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 9-11 (2000); BACHELDER
& DITZION, supra note 6, at 34 fig.6.5.
10 ALAN BERUBE ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE PRICE OF PAYING TAXES: How TAX
PREPARATION AND REFUND LOAN FEES ERODE THE BENEFITS OF THE EITC (2002), avail-
able at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/berubekimeitc.pdf.
1 Jeanne M. Hogarth & Kevin A. O'Donnell, Banking Relationships of Lower-Income
Families and the Government Trend Toward Electronic Payment, 85 FED. RES. BULL. 459,
463 (1999).
2 
JEAN ANN Fox & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED. OF AM., OVERDRAWN: CON-
SUMERS FACE HIDDEN OVERDRAFT CHARGES FROM NATION'S LARGEST BANKS 11 (2005),
available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFAOverdraftStudyJune2OO5.pdf.
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tle or no savings face a high risk of paying and can ill-afford. Moreover,
banks, unlike check-cashing outlets, hold checks for days before credit-
ing the deposit of funds; for low-income customers, the wait may not be
practical. These features of traditional bank accounts are key drivers in
keeping the unbanked out of the banking system.
A second barrier comes from difficulties that many unbanked per-
sons may have qualifying for conventional bank accounts because of past
problems with the banking system. Chex Systems, a private clearinghouse
that most banks use to decide whether to open accounts for potential cus-
tomers, records data on more than 22 million bank accounts that have been
closed for prior problems, such as customers writing checks with in-
sufficient funds or failing to pay overdraft fees. 3 While some individuals
with past account problems undoubtedly pose high risks, many people
could responsibly use online, electronic, no-overdraft bank accounts. By
eliminating the possibility of overdraft associated with conventional check-
ing, such debit card accounts could help consumers avoid high fees and
help banks avoid the risk of non-payment. Few banks, however, offer such
accounts, and most that do have begun doing so only recently.
Third, while many urban communities contain adequate numbers of
banks, in some low-income neighborhoods, banks, thrifts, and credit un-
ions are not as readily accessible to potential customers as such institutions
are in higher-income areas. 4
Fourth, for some low-income households, lack of financial education
is a significant barrier to personal financial stability.
Lastly, some immigrants may face difficulties regarding proper docu-
mentation for opening an account, either because they lack such documenta-
tion, or because they fear that depositories will police immigration laws.
C. Toward Inclusive Financial Services
The critical issue, in my judgment, is the financial services mismatch:
bank products are not structured to provide access to lower-income house-
holds. To transform the market for low-income financial services, I pro-
pose a tax incentive for financial institutions to offer low-cost electronic ac-
counts for low-income persons. 5 Financial institutions could receive a
tax credit equal to a fixed amount per account opened. Roughly speaking,
the amount of the credit would be calculated to cover the average admin-
istrative cost to an average bank of offering the account, taking into consid-
eration research and product development, account opening and closing
13 eFunds, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 8, 2006).
14 See Robert B. Avery et al., Changes in the Distribution of Banking Offices, 83 FED.
RES. BULL. 707, 723 (1997).
11 See generally BARR, BANKING THE POOR II, supra note *; MICHAEL STEGMAN, SAV-
INGS FOR THE POOR: THE HIDDEN BENEFITS OF ELECTRONIC BANKING (1999) (advocating
a shift towards e-banking).
20071
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costs, marketing and financial education, and the training of bank person-
nel. Although new data on account opening costs would be required, data
from the late 1990s suggests that the tax credit could perhaps be set between
$50 and $150 per account opened.
6
A tax credit could help catalyze banks, thrifts, and credit unions to
experiment with a wide variety of techniques to expand access to banking
services to low-income households. 7 Banks could avoid the risks associ-
ated with individuals with credit problems, and thus eliminate high fees,
by offering electronically based accounts that use online debit cards in-
stead of paper checks, and thus pose little risk of overdraft. Banks may
experiment with accounts with savings features, including separate sav-
ings "buckets" within accounts. 8 Similarly, banks could provide low-income
individuals with a convenient and low-cost means of paying bills and
wiring funds. Automated money orders, online bill payment, debit card-
based foreign country remittance, and other low-cost transactional ser-
vices can help low-income families improve both their savings and their
credit.
In addition, a tax credit for financial institutions has the potential to
help spur technological innovation in financial services. Possibilities
abound. ATM networks and financial institutions could develop shared tech-
nological platforms or create "surcharge-free alliances" among debit net-
works in order to serve low-income customers. As access to the internet
expands in low-income communities, e-finance can increasingly be made
available at internet kiosks. Companies that are exploring ways to expand
the use of cellular phones to transact financial services for high-income
clientele could be encouraged to focus attention on expanding bank account
access through pre-paid cellular phones used by low-income persons.
Stored-value cards could be used by the unbanked to conduct an array of
transactions at low cost.
Efforts to bank the unbanked could also focus on EITC recipients.
Currently, the United States Department of the Treasury runs a small Elec-
tronic Transfer Account (ETA) program to enable Social Security and other
benefit recipients to open low-cost, privately offered bank accounts to
receive their benefit payments by direct deposit rather than paper check. 9
With congressional authorization, Treasury could expand ETAs to cover
tax refunds, so that low-income taxpayers receiving the EITC could more
16 See DOVE ASSOCIATES, ETA INITIATIVE: OPTIONAL ACCOUNT FEATURES, ECONOMIC
WATERFALL ANALYSES (1998); DOVE ASSOCIATES, ETA CONJOINT RESEARCH 60 (1999),
available at http://fms.treas.gov/eta/reports/conjoint.pdf.
'7 Credit unions, which are not-for-profit corporations, could not directly take advan-
tage of tax credits. It is possible to structure the tax credit so that for-profit subsidiaries or
credit union service organizations could receive the tax credit for their services in offering
the accounts on behalf of the credit unions.
81 A "savings bucket" is an electronic sub-account that allows individuals to set money
aside for savings.
19 Barr, Banking the Poor I, supra note *, at 176.
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readily open bank accounts into which the IRS could directly deposit their
refunds. Moreover, Congress should appropriate more funds for Treas-
ury's First Accounts pilot program to support innovative efforts to reach
EITC recipients without bank accounts. 20 The IRS should establish part-
nerships with large employers to encourage employees to open bank ac-
counts and establish direct deposit of paychecks and tax refunds. More-
over, the tax preparation firms themselves should partner with banks to
develop and offer individual, low-cost, electronically based bank accounts
for their clients into which tax refunds can be directly deposited. Such
accounts might help to promote savings and reduce reliance on expensive
check-cashing services and refund anticipation loans. Tax preparers would
gain a new marketing tool and might see better client retention.
Moreover, Treasury and the IRS have now agreed to permit refunds
to be direct deposited into more than one bank account. 21 Once refunds
are permitted to be split into more than one account, tax preparers could
compete by offering tax preparation services that are paid for not out of
the proceeds of refund anticipation loans (RALs), but out of the tax re-
fund itself, via direct deposit. If this reform is combined with public and
private sector efforts to bring EITC recipients into the banking system,
the remaining portion of the refund could be direct deposited into the client's
own bank account or other saving vehicles. Initial results from a pilot re-
fund-spitting and saving program run by the Community Action Project
of Tulsa County and the Doorways to Dreams Fund showed promising sav-
ings results.
2
More fundamentally, to bring unbanked taxpayers into the financial
system, Congress should establish a new opt-out, direct deposit, tax refund
account. Under the initiative, the IRS would encourage savings and ex-
panded access to banking services by opening bank accounts on behalf of
unbanked EITC recipients and then directly depositing EITC payments
(and other tax refunds) into those accounts. Banks would register with
the IRS to offer a no-overdraft, debit card-based bank account to individ-
ual taxpayers. The IRS would draw from the roster of banks from the
taxpayers' local area in assigning the new account. The recipient would
retain the right to opt-out of such direct deposit tax accounts, but the de-
fault position would be to open a new account in her name. By reaching
low-income households at a critical financial decision-making point in
20 Details of the First Accounts program may be found at U.S. Treas. Dep't., First Ac-
counts, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financial-institution/fin-education/first
accounts/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
2' Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS Expands Taxpayers' Options for Direct
Deposit of Refunds (May 31, 2006), http://www.irs.gov/newsroomarticle/O,,id= 157853,00.
html.
22 See generally PETER TUFANO, ET AL., THE RETIREMENT SECURITY PROJECT, LEVER-
AGING TAX REFUNDS TO ENCOURAGE SAVING (2005), available at http://www.people.hbs.
edu/ptufano/RSPBST.pdf.
2007]
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their year, such a strategy may help bring these households into the bank-
ing system and give them an important opportunity to save.
In addition to federal reforms, states should integrate access to financial
services as a core element of welfare-to-work strategies. High-cost alter-
native financial services undermine state-led efforts to improve workforce
participation because such financial services reduce effective take-home
pay. The lack of structured savings mechanisms makes it less likely that
new entrants into the workforce will use savings to insure against liquid-
ity crises from job loss, injury, or other family emergencies, and makes it
more likely that such crises will push families back onto the welfare rolls.
Moreover, lack of saving will reduce the ability of low-income families
to invest in homeownership, skills development, or their children's edu-
cation.
Many states currently use Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards-
a form of debit card-to administer social insurance programs in lieu of
cash, vouchers, or paper checks. Most states do not link EBT cards to the
recipient's bank account, but use a state-owned master fund. To move wel-
fare and other benefit recipients into the financial system, states should
encourage account ownership by shifting from EBTs to individually owned
bank accounts. States could also negotiate with debit card networks to
create surcharge-free alliances for EBT-card holders. In so doing, states
would increase the effectiveness of their welfare-to-work strategies by
bringing low-income families into the banking system in preparation for
their entry into the workforce. States should permit former welfare recipients
to retain accounts after they move into the workforce to decrease reliance on
check-cashing services and encourage direct deposit. Given the high turn-
over rates of households on and off welfare, permitting families to retain
EBT-issued bank accounts may be important to those families' financial
stability.
III. SAVINGS
A. Saving and Dis-Saving
Savings policy can be informed by theoretical models of household
decision-making tested against empirical data regarding savings behav-
ior.23 The dominant rational choice model is the "life cycle" theory, which
suggests that savings are used to smooth consumption over one's life.24
23 This section draws from Michael Sherraden & Michael S. Barr, Institutions and In-
clusion in Savings Policy, in BUILDING ASSETS, BUILDING CREDIT: CREATING WEALTH IN
Low-INCOME COMMUNITIES 286 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005) and
Michael S. Barr, Financial Services and Saving: Theory and Evidence from the American
Dream Demonstration, Address at Washington University Conference: Taking the Measure
of the American Dream Demonstration (Apr. 2005).
24 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION: A STUDY By
THE NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (1957); Franco Modigliani & Richard Brumberg,
[Vol. 1
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An extension of the rational choice model posits that precautionary mo-
tives also influence saving; that is, rational individuals with full foresight
save as a form of insurance in the face of uncertainty.25 Behavioral mod-
els suggest that although these rational choice theories may be useful at
the aggregate level, individual choices regarding saving are profoundly af-
fected by psychology: mental accounting, starting points, endowment ef-
fects, and other frames.2 6 For example, groundbreaking empirical research
has demonstrated the importance of default rules in determining whether
and how much individuals will save in employer-sponsored retirement
plans. 27 But more empirical research is needed about saving by low- and
moderate-income households.
Low-income families are largely excluded from society's basic mecha-
nisms to encourage savings, and often lack access to even basic institu-
tional savings vehicles. Two-thirds of tax benefits for pensions go to the
top 20% of Americans, while the bottom 60% receive only 12% of the tax
benefit.28 Most low-income workers work for firms without savings plans or
are not covered by such plans.2 9 As noted above, 22% of low-income house-
holds lack even a bank account, a critical entry point for saving.3" Bank
accounts are not structured to be low-cost and low-risk for low-income
households. High minimum balances, credit checks to open accounts, high
bounced check and overdraft fees, and long check-holding periods are not
designed for the lives and finances of low- and moderate-income house-
holds.3 And given their low levels of assets, most banks have historically
not wanted them. The lack of sufficient income to afford saving and lack
of supply in savings products for the poor, coupled with low rates of return
offered to the poor given their low levels of wealth, all depress saving
among low-income households.
Yet evidence suggests that some low- and moderate-income households
can and do save. For example, a high portion of low- and moderate-income
Utility Analysis and Aggregate Consumption Functions: An Interpretation of Cross-Section
Data, in POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 388 (Kenneth K. Kurihara ed., 1954).
21 See generally Christopher D. Carroll, The Buffer-Stock Theory of Saving: Some Macro-
economic Evidence, 1992 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 61 (1992).
26 See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES
(2000).
27 See e.g., James J. Choi, et al., Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant
Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance, 16 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 67 (2002); Brigitte C.
Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and
Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. EcoN. 1149 (2001); Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save
More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL.
EcON. S164 (2004).
28 Lawrence H. Summers, Remarks at the Department of Labor Retirement Savings Edu-
cation Campaign (July 18, 2000).
29 Peter Orszag & Robert Greenstein, Toward Progressive Pensions: A Summary of the
U.S. Pension System and Proposals for Reform, in INCLUSION IN THE AMERICAN DREAM:
ASSETS, POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 262, 264-68 (Michael Sherraden ed., 2005).
30 Barr, Banking the Poor I, supra note *, at 130-31.
31 Id. at 178.
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workers participate in 401(k) plans if offered the chance to do so.32 Some
73% of federal employees earning $10,000 to $20,000 participated in the
Thrift Savings Plan as did 51% of those earning under $10,000.13 About
30% of families in the bottom income quintile saved in the year prior to
2001.34 Automatic enrollment in employer-sponsored pension plans boosts
participation and asset accumulation among low-income, as well as Black
and Hispanic, employees.35 When welfare benefit asset limits are raised,
low-income households may respond by saving more, although the empiri-
cal evidence is not strong.36 This evidence provides some support for the
notion that low-income households can save, and that savings are at least
in part shaped by institutional mechanisms that encourage saving.
Consistent with behavioral economic research on default rules and
framing, the American Dream Demonstration (ADD), a pilot program to
encourage Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), shows that properly
designed institutional mechanisms can and do encourage low- and moderate-
income families to save.37 ADD demonstrated the effectiveness of facilita-
tion, incentives, and other institutional constructs: these include providing
incentives and expectations through matching contributions and savings
goals, using direct deposit to facilitate savings plans, and using opt-out
techniques to ease participation a. 3 However, ADD also demonstrates that
small-scale, nonprofit-oriented efforts at extending financial services are
generally not cost-effective; only a national program, emphasizing inte-
gration with mainstream banking services and use of technology, can cost-
effectively improve access to savings services.3 9
B. Policies To Encourage Saving and Asset Accumulation
What will it take encourage savings? We need to find ways to inte-
grate savings policies for the poor into the product offerings of financial
institutions. Financial institutions need to be able to earn a profit from these
activities, and lower-income households are unlikely to be the first place
32 Orszag & Greenstein, supra note 29, at 269.
" U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TSP PARTICIPATION AND CONTRIBUTION RATES
(1998) (mimeo on file with the author).
14 Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the
1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 4 tbl.1 (2003).
11 See Choi et al., supra note 27, at 78; see also Madrian & Shea, supra note 27, at
1160.
36 See generally Elizabeth T. Powers, Does Means-Testing Welfare Discourage Saving?
Evidence From a Change in AFDC Policy in the United States, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 33 (1998);
James P. Ziliak, Income Transfers and Assets of the Poor, 85 REv. ECON. STAT. 63 (2003).
31 See Sherraden & Barr, Institutions and Inclusion in Savings Policy, supra note 23.
38 For details regarding the components of an institutional approach to savings, see
generally, id.
31 Peter Tufano's innovative "Doorways to Dreams" project provides an excellent ex-
ample of using the internet to reduce costs. Information on this project can be found at http://
www.d2dfund.org.
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firms look for assets and cross-selling opportunities.' As noted above, we
should establish a new tax credit to financial institutions to provide low-cost
bank accounts and savings products for low- and moderate-income house-
holds.
In this regard, the Savings for Working Families Act is one promis-
ing approach. Under the Act, financial institutions offering IDAs would re-
ceive tax credits annually offsetting up to $500 in bank-provided matching
funds and $50 in bank account administration costs. The current legislation,
drafted with an overall cap on accounts, would provide for up to 900,000
new IDAs at a cost of $1.3 billion.4 The cap on the number of accounts
may limit financial institution interest in developing the infrastructure
necessary to support these accounts, and it should be removed. If permit-
ted to operate without a cap, this legislation could help us to move from
small-scale, nonprofit-focused efforts to large-scale, financial-institution-
driven financial products that meet the longer-term savings needs of low-
income families. Nonprofits could continue to play important roles by pro-
viding financial education and by recruiting and screening participants.
Employer-based savings plans are also critical. As mentioned above,
employers can encourage savings among low- and moderate-income work-
ers by changing default rules so that employees contribute automatically
to savings plans unless they affirmatively choose to opt out. Moreover, in
2001, Congress enacted a "Saver's Credit," which provides a progressive
tax credit matching up to 50% of up to a $2000 annual contribution to a
low- or moderate-income person's retirement account.42 But 80% of those
eligible for the credit cannot take advantage of it because the credit is not
refundable.43 A useful step would be to make the Saver's Credit refundable,
so that low- and moderate-income households with little or no income tax
liability could benefit.' As proposed by Mark Iwry and his colleagues, Con-
gress should also enact an automatic IRA program so that workers who
want to save for retirement but do not have a 401(k) plan at work have a
ready mechanism to save."
I See Daniel Schneider & Peter Tufano, New Savings from Old Innovations: Assets Build-
ing for the Less Affluent (Cmty. Dev. Fin. Research Conf., Working Paper, 2005), available at
http://www.people.hbs.edu/ptufano/New%20Savings%20from%2001d%20 Innovations%203-
15-051.pdf.
Savings for Working Families Act of 2006, H.R. 4751, S. 922, 109th Cong. (2006).
42 See generally Peter Orszag & Robert Greenstein, Address to Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment Conference: Building Assets, Building Credit: A Symposium on Improving Financial
Services in Low-Income Coummunities (Nov. 18-19 2003).
" Leonard B. Burman et al., Distributional Effects of the Defined Contribution Plans
and Individual Retirement Arrangements (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Ctr., Discussion Paper
No. 16, 2004), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311029_TPCDPI6.pdf.
" See William G. Gale et al., The Saver's Credit: Issues and Options (Brookings Insti-
tute Retirement Security Project, 2004).
41 See Mark Iwry & David John, Pursuing Universal Retirement Security Through
Automatic IRAs, (Ret. Sec. Project, Working Paper, Feb. 2006), available at http://www.
retirementsecurityproject.org/pubs/File/AutolRAworkingpaper.pdf.
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These initiatives can serve as building blocks to a real national sav-
ings policy, one that is universal, progressive, earned by working, and pro-
vides savings opportunities in addition to the essential social insurance em-
bodied in Social Security. The federal government should provide a pro-
gressive match through the tax code for households who save. Larger
matches should be provided to those at the lower end of the income spec-
trum; the present system does precisely the opposite, providing the lion's
share of the benefits to the wealthiest taxpayers, whose saving behavior is
least affected by tax incentives. Progressive matches can be provided
through refundable tax credits or through tax credits to financial institu-
tions that provide the match.
While retirement savings are important, low- and moderate-income
households need to save for a much broader range of purposes, from emer-
gencies to homeownership. These households need an easy mechanism
through which to save, and greater help in building up their savings. In
addition to providing matching funds and improved access to accounts,
Congress should encourage financial institutions to structure accounts to
encourage long-term savings. Financial institutions could offer low-cost
bank accounts to low- and moderate-income individuals that include a
"savings bucket." The program could make these funds harder for indi-
viduals to withdraw, or simply designate them as for a special purpose. Par-
ticipants would set up an automatic payroll deduction plan at work to place
a specified amount from each paycheck in this savings bucket when their
paychecks are directly deposited. The financial institution would agree to
match the amount placed in this savings bucket, and the tax credit mecha-
nism would fully offset the amount of the match provided. The financial
institutions could make it somewhat harder to access funds held in these
savings buckets, but participants could use the funds for the full range of
their savings needs as they themselves determine: for emergencies in the
event of illness or job loss; for school expenses; to save for a major pur-
chase, such as a car or appliance; or for homeownership or entrepreneur-
ship. Such an account would help low-income households save for the short
to medium term, as well as begin to create a path toward other forms of
saving, including, potentially, for retirement.
By contrast to these inclusive approaches, the current Administration
has proposed a dramatic expansion of tax-advantaged savings vehicles
and privatization of a portion of Social Security into individual accounts.
These "ownership society" proposals share some of the rhetoric associated
with the advocates of IDAs and with the asset-building movement gener-
ally, but the similarity ends there. The essential normative claim of IDA
advocates is that all of us ought to be-included in this ownership society.
Policies that undermine our common stake in society go in the wrong direc-
tion.
Individual accounts diverted from Social Security, as Peter Diamond
and Peter Orszag have shown, will undermine the progressivity and social
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insurance functions of Social Security. I Moreover, it will expose house-
holds to individualized market risk, significantly increase administrative
costs, and harm the solvency of the Social Security Trust Fund, in whose
name the proposal is offered. Moreover, the Administration's proposal
would likely significantly reduce benefits from the combined individual
and Social Security accounts. A universalist, progressive savings policy is
opposite from Social Security reform proposals that undermine social insur-
ance in the name of individual accounts.
IV. CREDIT
A. Theory
Liquidity constraints-whether based on price or access-can affect
consumption, savings, work incentives, insurance, and time horizons for
financial decision-making. Yet little empirical work has been done until
recently on the credit constraints facing low-income households. 47 Some
recent evidence does suggest that households are unable to access unsecured
credit in order to avoid hardships when they suffer a spell of unemployment,
suggesting that credit constraints still plague low-income households.
4
While low- and moderate-income households do need access to credit,
there are dangers to these households from assuming too much credit on
the wrong terms.49 In theory, low-income households would be more risk-
averse with respect to taking on credit than higher-income households be-
cause their income is likely to be volatile and they have little assets on
which to fall back. Low-income households might be less risk-averse in
taking on offered credit than other households, however, precisely because
they have less to lose by going bankrupt.50
For the purposes of this Essay, I only want to highlight four credit
segments that illustrate how some products and practices can prove to be
disadvantageous for low- and moderate-income households. In each case,
I suggest how both regulatory responses and private-sector initiatives might
help to change market structures in positive ways.
46 See generally PETER A. DIAMOND & PETER R. ORSZAG, SAVING SOCIAL SECURITY:
A BALANCED APPROACH (2003).
" This section draws from Barr, Banking the Poor I, supra note *; Michael S. Barr,
Credit Where it Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 513 (2005); and Michael S. Barr, Modes of Credit Market Regulation, in BUILDING
ASSETS-BUILDING CREDIT: CREATING WEALTH IN Low-INCOME COMMUNITIES 206 (Nicolas
P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005).
41 See James X. Sullivan, Borrowing During Unemployment: Unsecured Debt as a Safety
Net 19-20 (2005), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005conf-paper_
session2 sullivan.pdf.
49 See Barr, Credit Where it Counts, supra note 47.
50 Little empirical evidence is available to sort out these competing theoretical claims.
In a later work, my co-authors and I use data from a survey we recently conducted, the Detroit
Area Household Financial Services Study, to unpack these claims.
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B. Credit Cards
In the consumer lending arena, creditors have made advances in risk-
screening and monitoring to push further into the market and have devel-
oped techniques for loss-mitigation that make it more profitable to serve
higher-risk customers. Many more households have gained access to credit
cards that in prior generations would have been denied credit entirely or
would have turned to even more expensive forms of credit.
Some of these techniques, however, raise serious questions about
whether they are net socially beneficial. For example, credit card disclo-
sures may be systematically designed to prey on common psychological
biases that limit consumer ability to make rational choices regarding credit
card borrowing." Behavioral economics suggests that consumers will un-
derestimate how much they will borrow and overestimate their ability to
pay their bills in a timely manner. 2 Credit card companies may price their
credit cards and compete on the basis of these fundamental human fail-
ings.53 Nearly sixty percent of credit card holders do not pay their bills in full
every month.5 4 Excessive credit card debt can lead to personal financial
ruin. Credit card debt is a good predictor of bankruptcy.55 Ronald Mann has
argued that credit card companies seek to keep consumers in a "sweat box"
of distressed credit card debt, paying high fees for as long as possible
before finally succumbing to bankruptcy. 6
Now that President Bush and the Congress have given us new bank-
ruptcy legislation57 in order to promote borrower responsibility, it is time
to focus on creditor responsibility. Credit card companies currently pro-
vide complex disclosures regarding teaser rates, introductory terms, vari-
able rate cards, penalties, and a host of other matters that are confusing to
consumers. 8 Credit card companies are not competing, it appears, to offer
the most transparent pricing.
Regulatory and legislative steps could help prod the credit card in-
dustry into better practices. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
intervened to require national banks to engage in better credit card prac-
5' See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004).
52 Id. at 1395-96.
13 Id. at 1394-95.
4 Brian K. Bucks et al. , Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the
2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Mar. 22, 2006, at Al,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/financesurvey.pdf.
55 
RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT
CARD MARKETS AROUND THE WORLD 60-69 (2006).
56 Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt,
2006 ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
51 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq (2005)).
51 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT 06-929, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED
COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS THE NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLO-
SURES TO CONSUMERS (2006).
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tices and to provide greater transparency on minimum payments, 9 and
the Federal Reserve is reviewing changes to its regulations under the Truth
in Lending Act (TILA), in part in the wake of TILA amendments con-
tained in the bankruptcy legislation. 6° Improved disclosures might help.
Congress, however, should step in and do more. For example, Con-
gress should at the very least require that minimum payment terms be
accompanied by clear statements regarding how long it would take, and
how much interest would be paid, if the customer's actual balance were
paid off only in minimum payments, and card companies should be re-
quired to state the monthly payment amount that would be required to pay
the customer's actual balance in full over some reasonable period of time.
These tailored disclosures may help consumers make better informed
choices about payments. Congress should also provide for clear notice
and a mandatory cure period of six months before credit card companies
can raise rates for failure timely to pay balances owed to another card com-
pany under "universal default" rules so that consumers have a chance to ad-
just their behavior before higher rates are applied.
In addition, Congress, bank regulators, industry, and consumer or-
ganizations ought to form a task force to debate more far reaching reforms
of an industry in need of a fresh look. For example, perhaps there should
be an "opt-out payment plan" for credit cards, under which consumers
would be required automatically to make the payment necessary to pay
off their existing balance over a relatively short period of time unless the
customer affirmatively opted-out of such a payment plan and chose an alter-
ative payment plan with a longer (or shorter) payment term. Given what
we know about default rules and framing, such a payment plan may be
easier to follow, resulting in lower rates of default. In any event, an optimal
payment plan may encourage card holders to alter their borrowing behav-
ior or their payoff plans. Moreover, credit card companies would find it
difficult to argue publicly against reasonable opt-out payment plans and,
in the face of such plans, to maintain a pricing model based on borrowers
going into financial distress. While there are undoubtedly problems with
such an approach, it would at least have the virtue of engaging all the rele-
vant players in a conversation about fundamental changes in market prac-
tice.
59 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. 2003-1,
CREDIT CARD LENDING: ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT AND LOSS ALLOWANCE GUIDANCE (2003);
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2004-4, SECURED
CREDIT CARDS (2004), available at http:llwww.occ.treas.govlftpladvisory/2004-4.doc;
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2004-10,
CREDIT CARD PRACTICES (2004), available at http:lwww.occ.treas.govlftpladvisoryl2004-
10.doc.
6 See Press Release, The Federal Reserve Board, Request for Comment on Second
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Concerning the Open-End (Revolving) Credit Rules
of Regulation Z (Oct. 11, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/
bcreg/2005/2005 1011 /default.htm.
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C. Payday Loans
Payday lenders provide short-term (usually two-week) consumer loans
to low- and moderate-income working people who have bank accounts but
lack credit cards, have poor credit history, or are tapped out on credit limits.
Payday loans carry high implicit annual interest rates, with an average APR
of over 470%. At an average loan size of about $300, the average fee just
for a single, two-week loan is about $54.6" Many borrowers, moreover, take
out payday loans repeatedly throughout the year, often because they can-
not repay their earlier payday loans. The typical payday loan customer takes
out anywhere from seven to eleven loans per year, with added fees for
each loan renewal or "rollover. 62 These borrowers can get caught in a "debt
trap," with payday lending fees eating up a significant portion of their in-
come net of essential living expenses.
Bank regulators have now shut down bank-payday lender partner-
ships because of safety and soundness concerns. 63 In addition, bank regu-
lators and the Federal Trade Commission should use their authority under
the Federal Trade Commission Act to take action against payday lenders
and their partners that are engaged in unfair and deceptive trade prac-
tices.' Regulators should pay particular attention to the problem of short-
term balloon payments, repeated refinancing, and inadequate or mislead-
ing disclosures under the TILA.65 Congress should also enact legislation
mandating that payday lenders report borrowers' performance to the credit
bureaus, so that borrowers can pursue alternatives based on their credit
history.
At the state level, regulation of payday lenders has been largely inef-
fectual to date, at least in part because payday lenders partnered with feder-
ally regulated banks and thrifts that could rely on federal pre-emption of
state usury laws. Moreover, state rollover laws have been largely ineffec-
tive because they can be easily evaded. Thus, some states are now focus-
ing on more effective legislation that would provide for longer minimum
terms for payday lending to reduce the likelihood that repeated refinancing
of payday loans becomes a debt trap. Other states are using payday loan
registries and mandatory data reporting requirements to give greater ef-
fect to anti-rollover laws.
61 See Barr, Banking the Poor 1, supra note *, at 154-55; see generally, Michael A.
Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model That Encourages Chronic
Borrowing, 17 EcoN. DEV. Q. 8 (2003).
62 See Stegman & Faris, supra note 61. In a recent study, half of payday loan custom-
ers were found to take out more than six loans per year. See Mark Flannery & Katherine
Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price? (FDIC Center for Financial
Research Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/cfr/2005/wp2005/CFRWP 2005-09_Flannery-Samolyk.pdf.
63 See Barr, Banking the Poor I, supra note *, at 160-61.
64See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2006).
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Over the long term, there is room for greater private sector competi-
tion from the banking industry in changing market practices. To date,
bank overdraft plans have been costly, poorly disclosed,66 and ill-suited to
low- and moderate-income households living on the financial edge. Such
overdraft plans may be a contributing cause to payday lending, not an alter-
native. Instead, banks could compete with payday lenders by offering lower-
cost, longer-term, and lower-risk loan products. In principle, one such alter-
native might be a bank line of credit offered to account holders. In the-
ory, lines of credit could be provided at lower cost than payday loans be-
cause there is no need for face-to-face interaction. The transactions can
take place automatically at low risk and at low cost to banks. Moreover,
repayment of the loan could be scheduled so that regular minimum pay-
ments (through automatic debiting of the customer's account) repay the
loan over a reasonably long time period, say six months, rather than the
current payday loan of two weeks or bank overdraft practice of thirty days.
An intermediate-term bank loan of this type could fill an important mar-
ket niche in serving low- and moderate-income households' financial
needs. Adding an automatic savings feature to the repayment schedule on
this bank account-based line of credit, as described in Part I, might also
help households develop a savings cushion that would make it less likely
they would need to take out a payday loan in the event of emergencies.
D. Refund Anticipation Loans
Tax refund loans are widely used by low- and moderate-income house-
holds. About two-thirds of EITC claimants use commercial tax prepara-
tion firms. In addition to seeking help with return preparation and filing,
many EITC recipients also use refund anticipation loans (RALs) and re-
lated products facilitated by tax preparers. The RAL is repaid when the
IRS issues the borrower's expected refund.
Tax preparation services and refund loans can consume a significant
portion of an EITC recipient's refund. The purchase of a RAL for an antici-
pated $1,500 refund costs roughly $90. For EITC recipients filing elec-
tronically and choosing to take out a RAL, total fees would consume an
average of 13% of the EITC or nearly 8% of the total refund from the
EITC and other credits. These fees total $1.75 billion annually for low-
income households. In addition, for the estimated 22% of EITC recipi-
ents, or four million households, who lack a bank account, the additional
fee to cash a $1,500 RAL check issued by the bank partner of the tax pre-
66The Federal Reserve Board provided inadequate guidance in this area by treating
overdraft policies as a deposit product, rather than a loan subject to TILA. See Truth in
Savings, Regulation DD, 12 C.F.R. § 230 (2005).
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parer would be at least $30-and often much more-at a check casher,
despite the low risk of the government checks.67
There are likely three main reasons why low-income households use
their refunds without waiting approximately four to six weeks for a paper
check from the IRS. Second, even banked customers receive cash pro-
ceeds from their loans eight to ten days sooner than with direct deposit,
and taxpayers often use RALs to pay off late or mounting bills faster. Third,
taxpayers who do not have the funds to pay for tax preparation services
up front find RALs and similar products necessary simply to pay prepar-
ers to file for their refund. Tax preparation fees are deducted from the
proceeds of the RAL. Thus, the need to have their returns professionally
prepared drives some households to take out RALs independent of their
desire to obtain a quicker refund.
The IRS, in responding to congressional pressure to increase e-filing
and decrease EITC errors, has helped to create the market for RALs by pro-
viding tax refund and offset information to preparers and by delaying EITC
refunds to conduct basic anti-fraud and error detection. The IRS now bears a
special responsibility to help end RAL abuse. After much encouragement
and many years, Treasury and IRS will now permit refunds to be direct
deposited into more than one bank account.68 Tax preparers could compete
by offering tax preparation services that are not paid out of the proceeds
of RALs, but are paid directly from a split-off portion of the tax refund.
This would eliminate any risk of nonpayment to the preparer and eliminate
one reason to take out a RAL. The remaining portion of the refund could
be direct deposited into the client's own bank account or other saving vehi-
cles. As discussed above, efforts to bank the unbanked may serve to drive
down demand for RALs.
E. Subprime Home Mortgage Loans
The expansion of lending by subprime home mortgage specialists to
a broader range of borrowers is generally a positive development, but seri-
ous problems in the subprime sector threaten to undermine progress for
low- and moderate-income households.69 Many households turn to subprime
home mortgage loans to consolidate other consumer debt, only to find them-
selves still unable to make ends meet. Bankruptcy and foreclosure rates
are much higher for subprime borrowers, and the choice to convert unse-
cured debt into a secured (mortgage) loan may end up being a bad choice
for many of these households.
Serious abuses in the subprime market have included repeated loan
"flipping" by brokers eager to earn fees; "packing" additional products into
67 BERUBE, supra note 10, at 7.
68 See Press Release, supra note 21.
69 See Barr, Credit Where it Counts, supra note 47.
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loans; hiding fees; lending without regard to the borrower's ability to repay;
and employing a wide variety of unscrupulous sales practices.7 ° For some
households, subprime refinancing may simply be more expensive than it
needs to be. Between 10% and 35% of subprime borrowers could have
qualified for a less expensive prime mortgage.7 Subprime borrowers are
more likely than not to remain subprime borrowers, rather than accessing
the prime market-even after accounting for credit risk.72 African Ameri-
can and Hispanic borrowers end up paying higher broker fees than white
borrowers in the subprime market.
7 3
In response to unscrupulous lending practices in the subprime home
equity mortgage market, Congress enacted the Home Ownership and Eq-
uity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA).7 4 For some "high cost" loans, HOEPA
imposes restrictions on certain contract provisions and provides for en-
hanced disclosures and enhanced remedies for violations. Unfortunately,
mortgage transactions are exceedingly complex, and HOEPA's record has
been mixed.7" In response, Treasury and HUD proposed a four-part approach
to curbing predatory lending, although many of these approaches remain
to be implemented.76
In my judgment, it is possible to move forward with additional reforms
to combat abusive lending while preserving the expansion of access to home
mortgage credit.77 For example, one key area in need of reform is the regula-
tion of mortgage brokers, who face little or no effective oversight at the
federal or state levels. Banning yield spread premiums-currently the
dominant form of broker compensation-and replacing them with flat fees
could take some of the sting out of broker abuses by eliminating an impor-
tant incentive for brokers to seek out higher-cost loans for customers. Enact-
ing legislation that requires lenders to track and report loan characteristics
and performance by individual mortgage brokers could help to improve con-
sumer shopping, increase regulatory oversight, and shame bad lenders, thus
making it harder for abuses to occur. State and federal regulators should
work together to drive abusive practices out of the broker industry.
70See DEP'T OF Hous. & URB. DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, CURBING
PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT (2000) [hereinafter JOINT RE-
PORT].
71 FREDDIE MAC, AUTOMATED UNDERWRITING: MAKING MORTGAGE LENDING SIM-
PLER AND FAIRER FOR AMERICA'S FAMILIES (1996), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/
corporate/reports/moseley/mosehome.htm.
72 Marsha J. Courchane et al., Subprime Borrowers: Mortgage Transitions and Out-
comes, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 365, 374-76 (2004).
13 Howell E. Jackson et al., Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread Premi-
ums, 12 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. (forthcoming 2007).
74 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat.
2190 (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
71 See, e.g., JOINT REPORT, supra note 71, at 106.
76 See id. Using its existing authority under HOEPA, the Federal Reserve Board has is-
sued a rule addressing the harmful sales practices and abusive terms often associated with
high-cost mortgages. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2001).
77 See, e.g., Barr, Credit Where it Counts, supra note 47.
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V. INSURANCE
Low- and moderate-income households face risks to their health, in-
come, employment, and household structure. Although further empirical
research is needed, it is likely that low- and moderate-income households
are underinsured and face steep costs of insurance for important life risks.
Insurance is functionally linked to saving, credit, and income. It helps
smooth consumption and protect asset accumulation, while also prevent-
ing or minimizing cascading shocks. For example, an auto accident with-
out insurance can lead to a job loss which can have devastating conse-
quences for family finances. For low-income households, insurance is likely
to be costly relative to income net of necessary living expenses, and tra-
ditional government-provided social insurance has become, in many
spheres, increasingly unavailable. Low-income households might employ
formal insurance mechanisms, such as unemployment, disability, and health
insurance, as well as informal mechanisms, such as borrowing from friends
and family. They may also self-insure through saving, holding durables,
or other means. Empirical research can contribute to our understanding of
the extent to which low-income households are underinsured and can begin
to tease out the links among insurance, savings, and credit as substitutes
in providing a cushion against hardship for low- and moderate-income
households. Many financial hardships can be understood as insurance fail-
ures. Given space constraints, this Essay only sketches broad ideas in a
few basic areas and offers suggestions for future research.
A. Income Insurance
The biggest risk to household financial stability comes from loss of a
job. There are no private insurance markets to cover this risk. Federal and
state safety net programs do provide some insurance against job loss for
low- and moderate-income households. State Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF) programs, while time-limited, do offer respite at
minimal levels of support for low-income, low-asset households. Unem-
ployment insurance offers some measure of insurance for job loss, but un-
employment insurance generally provides low rates of income replace-
ment. Moreover, many low-income workers who have worked in tempo-
rary or seasonal jobs have difficulty qualifying for unemployment pay-
ments, or qualify only for drastically reduced payments. Furthermore, in
severe economic downturns, unemployment insurance is likely to run out
for low-income workers, who are likely to be less educated and require more
time to reenter the labor market. Unemployment insurance reforms could
increase coverage for low-wage workers.
While more fundamental forms of income insurance are certainly pos-
sible, it may be more practical to build on what already exists. For exam-
ple, the EITC can be thought of as a form of income insurance, in the sense
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that workers who wind up in low-paying jobs have their income supple-
mented by the EITC. A single mom with two children working full time
at the minimum wage would earn almost $11,000 per year and receive an
EITC of nearly $4,500, an increase in her take home pay of approximately
40%. The EITC has helped to lift millions of people out of poverty and has
made it easier to make ends meet for more than 20 million households.
The EITC also encourages workforce participation. Given its positive ef-
fects, a significant expansion of the EITC ought to undergird our policies
regarding low- and moderate-income households over the next decade. EITC
expansion would provide significant additional income insurance for low-
income households. Such an expansion is critical to maintaining our so-
cial fabric as returns to low-skilled labor continue to stagnate while returns
to capital and high-skill labor continue to grow.
B. Health Insurance
More than 45 million Americans, nearly 16% of the population, lacked
any government or private health insurance in 2003.78 A third of the unin-
sured earn under $25,000 a year and another third earn between $25,000 and
$50,000. 7 9 Government health insurance does help other households: over
35 million low-income households do have access to Medicaid," and the
state-administered Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) makes
health insurance available for about three million children in many work-
ing poor households who are above the poverty line but cannot afford
health insurance. 8 But many families still find themselves uninsured or
underinsured as they move into and out of eligibility for employer or gov-
ernment-funded health insurance coverage. Many have difficulty finding
doctors who will accept Medicaid payments and must rely on emergency
room care for basic medical services.82 Most uninsured low-income workers
are not offered health insurance at work, and in most states working par-
ents are "ineligible for Medicaid if they work full time at the minimum
wage .... 83
We have forgotten about the promise of fundamental health insurance
reform, but that does not mean the problem has gone away."M The federal
78 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2003, at 15-16 (2004).
791d. at 17.
10Id. at 14.
s' See Judith Feder et al., Covering the Low-Income Uninsured: The Case for Expand-
ing Public Programs, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 27, 27-39.
82 See LISA DUCHON ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, SECURITY MATTERS: How
INSTABILITY IN HEALTH INSURANCE PUTS U.S. WORKERS AT RISK (2001), available at http://
www.cmwf.org/usr -doc/duchon securitymatters_512.pdf.
83 Feder, supra note 81, at 29.
4 See generally Theodore R. Marmor & Michael S. Barr, Making Sense of the Na-
tional Health Insurance Reform Debate, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 228 (1992).
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government should continue to expand coverage for low- and moderate-
income households through subsidies to state CHIP programs and through
enhanced measures to sign up eligible children, so that all children in the
United States have health insurance coverage. The same basic model can
be used to expand health coverage for low- and moderate-income adults,
as Judith Feder has argued, by gradually expanding CHIPs to cover low-
and moderate-income adults and offering higher levels of subsidy and lower
levels of copayments and deductibles for those least able to afford them.8"
Expanding health insurance to these households is important in its own
right and also minimizes the risk that a major illness will cascade into
other problems, such as job loss, eviction or foreclosure, and bankruptcy.
C. Home Insurance
Low- and moderate-income households also have more difficulty ob-
taining and paying for home insurance.8 6 Insurance companies underwrite
based on a variety of factors that are relatively disadvantageous for these
households. For example, low-income households tend to live in smaller,
older, less valuable homes, and these factors influences both rate and in-
surance availability. Neighborhood rating factors, such as crime, are likely
to be worse for low-income households. Some insurance companies rate
for credit risk, which is disproportionately likely to harm lower income
households. Insurance agents tend to be located in and focus on commu-
nities outside of central cities.87 There is also evidence, hotly contested, that
insurers have based decisions on factors correlated with race, apart from
objective factors regarding loss rates.88 Given the link between race and
income, such policies would tend to result in costlier insurance or less cov-
erage in low-income communities.
State and federal policies could improve the market for home insur-
ance. Building on existing voluntary reporting, requiring disclosure from
all insurers of information about the location, race, gender, and income
of applicants and policyholders could help firms and regulators monitor
compliance with fair housing laws.89 State Fair Access to Insurance Re-
85 See Feder, supra note 81, at 34 (proposing expansion of Medicaid and CHIP to low-
income adults).86
See generally INSURANCE. REDLINING: DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT AND THE
EVOLVING ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1997).
" See Robert W. Klein, Availability and Affordability Problems in Urban Homeowners
Insurance Markets, in INSURANCE REDLINING, supra note 86, at 43, 47-48; Jay D. Schultz,
Homeowners Insurance Availability and Agent Location, in INSURANCE REDLINING, supra
note 86, at 83, 94.
88 See Klein, supra note 87, at 45; D.J. Powers, The Discriminatory Effects of Home-
owners Insurance Underwriting Guidelines, in INSURANCE REDLINING, supra note 86, at
119, 133-39.
19 The Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2006), prohibits discrimi-
nation in housing transactions. HUD and the courts apply FHA to home insurance. See
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351 (6th Cir. 1995); NAACP v. American
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quirements (FAIR) and similar residual risk plans that provide access to
home insurance for households that do not meet industry standards can
be expanded, although potential problems from adverse selection-under
which the worst risks would enter the plan-and crowding out-under
which private plans would be supplanted by the residual plans-require
further study.9° A number of firms have agreed to increase marketing and
outreach in minority communities as part of settlements of fair housing
complaints,9 and similar efforts could be undertaken to enhance competi-
tion for insurance provision in low-income areas. Community-based organi-
zations can work with insurers to screen and monitor participants and
provide local market information to diminish the extent to which stereo-
typing reduces access to insurance products. 92
D. Savings as Insurance
Saving is a form of self-insurance. Yet low- and moderate-income
households often have fewer assets and family supports on which to fall
back. As Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Tyagi have shown, 93 if both par-
ents are present in the household and working to make ends meet, when one
of them loses a job, there is often no other household member who could
then enter the workforce and make up for the lost wages. Other family mem-
bers-parents, siblings, and the like-are likely to have low levels of as-
sets on which they can draw to help their relatives. African American house-
holds are much more likely to have lower asset levels on which they can
draw in emergencies than white households, and their extended families
tend to have lower levels of assets as well. The asset safety net for these
households is thin. As a result, low- and moderate-income households are
also more likely to be liquidity constrained than other households and
thus have a harder time using credit to weather hardships for which their
insurance is inadequate. For example, households with assets can borrow
during temporary unemployment in order to avoid hardships, but households
without assets are unable to use credit to smooth income variance.
94
Social Security is one form of insurance that does work for low-
income, elderly households. Social Security (and Medicare) has helped to
significantly reduce elderly poverty. Moreover, for some 20% of Social
Security recipients, Social Security is their sole form of income. Social
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992); 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2006). But
see Mackey v. Nationwide-Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).
90 See Klein, supra note 87, at 77-78.
"1 See William H. Lynch, NAACP v. American Family, in INSURANCE REDLINING, su-
pra note 86, at 157, 177.
92 See George Knight, What's Working: Insurance as a Link to Neighborhood Revitali-
zation, in INSURANCE REDLINING, supra note 86, at 215, 231-32.
91 See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO INCOME TRAP: WHY
MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (2003).
94 See Sullivan, supra note 48, at 19-20.
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Security also provides a form of lifetime income insurance, in the sense
that returns to low-income workers are higher than returns to high-wage
workers upon retirement. Yet, as discussed above, the current Administra-
tion is proposing to weaken the Social Security Trust Fund and under-
mine social insurance in the name of private accounts. Social Security is
bedrock old-age insurance for low- and moderate-income households and
must be preserved and strengthened, not undermined.
VI. CONCLUSION
Like the rest of America, low- and moderate-income people need a
range of financial services to deploy the income earned from their hard
work in the service of the financial stability of their households. Yet the
financial services they get tend to be relatively expensive, and such house-
holds are often excluded from society's basic mechanisms to promote
asset accumulation. These households often pay more for credit or are de-
nied access to credit and often are underinsured against life's important
risks. The "financial services mismatch" that I have described leaves such
families adrift.
Just as the private sector is largely focused on upper income house-
holds, public policy is largely geared towards increasing the returns to
capital for those who have accumulated assets, rather than towards increas-
ing savings and asset accumulation among those who have been left be-
hind. Rather than continuing to shift the tax burden from higher income
taxpayers to middle income households and future generations and mov-
ing to private accounts carved out of Social Security, public policy should
instead focus on increasing the income and assets of low- and moderate-
income households in the years ahead.
I have outlined a series of steps in four key areas: financial services,
savings, credit and insurance. For example: we can enact a tax credit to help
bank the unbanked and engage the IRS in reaching millions of unbanked
EITC and other tax refund recipients with a new opt-out, direct deposit,
tax refund bank account. We can enact an employer-based, progressive sav-
ings policy with automatic enrollment that builds on existing retirement
programs and the knowledge gained from IDA pilot initiatives regarding
the savings needs of low- and moderate-income households for emergen-
cies, asset building and other goals. We can work to reduce abuses in sub-
prime credit markets, and establish an automatic, opt-out credit card pay-
ment plan to reduce financial distress, while continuing to provide house-
holds with the credit they need. And we can do better at helping low- and
moderate-income households insure against life's risks. These initiatives are
the core of an inclusive, progressive national savings and financial services
policy.
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